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Arbitrability after Green Tree v. Bazzle: Is There
Anything Left for the Courts?
KRISTEN M. BLANKLEY*
In the summer of 2003, the Supreme Court decided in the plurality of Green
Tree v. Bazzle that if an agreement to arbitrate is silent on the issue of the
permissibility of class action arbitrations, the arbitrator-and not the
court-should decide whether a class action proceeding is appropriate. The
effects of this opinion will be twofold. First, the plurality's discussion of
arbitrability almost creates a presumption that an arbitrator, rather than a
court, will decide preliminary issues other than contract formation and
applicability of arbitration to the dispute at hand. Second, the Court grants
sweeping power to the arbitrator to decide whether arbitration is
appropriate without giving arbitrators any guidance on how to run a class
action arbitration. Unfortunately, this opinion leaves open more questions
than it answers, and future courts will have to refine the scope of the
arbitrator's powers and the requirements for class action arbitrations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree v. Bazzle' is the next
in a line of cases giving increasing power to an arbitrator to hear questions of
arbitrability, or the question of whether arbitration is appropriate. Courts
have long distinguished between questions of "substantive" arbitrability and
"procedural" arbitrability. The traditional rule is that the courts decide
questions of "substantive" arbitrability, such as questions of contract
formation and the scope of an arbitration agreement, and arbitrators decide
"procedural" arbitrability issues, which typically relate to defenses and
waivers.2 The Court, in 2002, broadened the scope of "procedural"
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'123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
2 This distinction is present in the Court's decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). In First Options, the contract to arbitrate was never
signed by one of the parties, so the Court needed to determine whether an agreement to
arbitrate actually existed. Id. at 941. The Court held that parties typically expect courts to
determine some questions, such as formation, because otherwise the parties' dispute
would be resolved through an arbitration that is, in essence, not voluntary. See id. at 942-
43. The Court did not use the terms "procedural" and "substantive" arbitrability, even
though they were commonly known terms of art, and this decision was consistent with
these ideas.
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arbitrability in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.3 when it held that the
arbitrator, rather than the court, should determine the applicability of any
relevant statutes of limitations . The effect of the Court's decision in Green
Tree v. Bazzle further enlarges the scope of "procedural" arbitrability
questions by holding that the arbitrator should decide whether a contract
allows a class action arbitration when the contract is silent on this precise
issue.5 The black letter law arising from this case is clear; however, the
questions that the Court leaves unanswered are troubling.
This Comment will explore both the plurality and dissenting opinions in
this case in light of the court opinions leading up to the decision in Bazzle to
determine if Bazzle was correctly decided. It will then discuss the impact of
this case on future arbitrations and arbitration clauses, including the impact
of leaving crucial questions unanswered in an opinion that is unusually short
considering the importance of the decision.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two cases from the South
Carolina Supreme Court.6 Although both sets of plaintiffs signed the same
contract with Green Tree Financial, the procedural histories differed.7 All of
' 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
4 Id. at 86. The Court decided that a statute of limitations defense is similar to any
other defense, so the arbitrator was the appropriate decision-maker. See id. at 84-85.
However, this question becomes a much closer call considering 1) that statutes of
limitations are created for courts, and 2) that arbitrators do not necessarily have to follow
the law when they are rendering their opinions. Note that in Howsam, the Court similarly
moves away from the "substantive" and "procedural" language. This shift in language is
more striking in Howsam than in First Options because the issue in Howsam was far less
"cut and dry" than the issue in First Options.
5 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2408.
6 Id. at 2406.7 Id. at 2405-06. Lynne and Burt Bazzle entered into a home improvement loan
agreement with Green Tree, while Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs entered
into mobile home loans and security agreements. The arbitration clause states:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to
this contract or the relationships which result from this contract ... shall be resolved
by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This
arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1 ... THE
PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY
HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER
THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION BY US (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN) .... The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all
powers provided by the law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal
and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
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the plaintiffs filed suit against Green Tree alleging non-compliance with
South Carolina banking laws.8 The first set of plaintiffs, Lynn and Burt
Bazzle, requested that the court certify their claims as a class action. The
district court first certified the class action and then compelled arbitration; at
arbitration, the arbitrators awarded the Bazzle class $10,935,000 in
damages. 9 Similarly, the other plaintiffs, Daniel Lackey and George and
Florine Buggs, also sought certification, but Green Tree moved to compel
arbitration. ° Although the trial court denied the motion to compel, Green
Tree won a reversal on interlocutory appeal." For these plaintiffs, the
arbitrator certified the class and ultimately awarded $9,200,000 in
damages. 12 Green Tree appealed on the ground that class action arbitration
was legally impermissible."3
When the case reached the South Carolina Supreme Court, that court
consolidated the proceedings and affirmed the awards, holding that even
though the contract was silent on the issue of class action arbitration, the
arbitrations were consistent with South Carolina law. 14 The South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the lower courts for three reasons: 1) the ambiguous
contract should be construed against Green Tree, the drafter, 5 2) South
Carolina law strongly favors arbitration and there is no South Carolina law
that prohibits class-wide arbitration, 6 and 3) repeat players such as Green
Tree should not be able to preclude class action arbitrations in their contracts
Id. at 2405.
I d. Specifically, the loan contracts failed to provide the plaintiffs with a "legally
required form that would have told them that they had a right to name their own lawyers
and insurance agents and would have provided space for them to write in those names."
Id. 9Id. at 2405. Following the order to compel arbitration, Green Tree, pursuant to the
arbitration clause, selected an arbitrator. The arbitrator conducted the class action and
rendered an award for the class. Id. The award consisted of both statutory damages and
attorney fees. Id.
1° Id.
" Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
12 Id. at 2406. This award consisted of statutory damages and attorney fees. Id.
13 id.
14 Id. (citing Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 2002)).
15 Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 359. The contract is ambiguous because it is silent on the
issue of class action arbitrations. The court stated, "In our opinion, this language does not
limit the arbitration to non-class arbitration. At best, it creates an ambiguity, and should,
therefore, be construed against the drafting party, Green Tree." Id.
16 Id. at 360. In 1995, the Seventh Circuit held that class action arbitration is not
permitted when a contract is silent on the issue because the Federal Arbitration Act
requires the courts to interpret the contracts according to their terms. Id. at 356 (citing
Champ v. Siegal Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995). The South Carolina
Supreme Court rejects this idea because, inter alia, the Supreme Court has never held the
section of the FAA relied upon by the Seventh Circuit as being applicable to state courts.
2004)
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of adhesion. 17 The South Carolina Supreme Court also noted that the lower
courts did not abuse their discretion, and, as such, the decisions should
stand.18
The South Carolina Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of
arbitrability. Although the court noted that the court certified the Bazzles'
case while the arbitrator certified Lackey's case, it did not make a distinction
between the two cases on this point. The Supreme Court of the United States
grated certiorari to determine if the South Carolina Supreme Court acted
consistently with the Federal Arbitration Act.19
III. THE PLURALITY OPINION
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Breyer, treated this case as one
involving simple contract interpretation. After examining the contract
language, the plurality stated: "Under the terms of the parties' contracts, the
question-whether the agreement forbids class arbitration-is for the
arbitrator to decide.",20 Essentially, the plurality characterizes the dispute as a
loan dispute. By characterizing the dispute in this manner, the plurality
assumes that the parties intended the arbitrator to hear this question because
the broad arbitration agreement 2 contained in the contract included all
controversies "relating to the contract," even though the agreement to
arbitrate is silent on the issue of class action arbitration.22 In other words,
because the language of the arbitration agreement was so broad, the
agreement covered virtually all arbitrability questions-including the
question of who should make this class action determination.23
The plurality acknowledged that parties to an arbitration agreement do
not intend to submit each and every issue to an arbitrator.24 Unless the parties
clearly indicate otherwise, some issues are reserved for the courts, and these
are the issues that "contracting parties would likely have expected a court" to
17 Id. at 360-61. This argument is similar to an argument based on unconscionability,
see infra note 61, but it is not couched in exactly the same terms.Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 361.
9Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2404.
201 Id. at 2407.
21 Id. The contract stated that it covers "all disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract." Id.22 id.
23 See id.
24 Id. ("In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended
courts, not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter (in the absence of
'clear and unmistakable' evidence to the contrary).")(citing AT&T Tech., Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
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determine.25 The types of issues suitable for the courts are termed "gateway"
issues, and they include "whether the parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to
a certain type of controversy., 26 These two categories, however, are
admittedly narrow, and the plurality appears to state that unless the case falls
within these two categories, the arbitrator will decide any questions under a
broad arbitration agreement.
Next, the Court held that the controversy at issue does not fall within the
two exceptions so the arbitrator should have heard the issue in the first
instance.27 The parties clearly had a valid agreement to arbitrate, so the first
exception did not apply. The plurality also held that the parties agreed to
arbitrate this particular issue.28 In order to reach this result, the plurality
distinguished this case from First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.29 The
plurality drew this distinction by noting, "Unlike First Options, the question
is not whether the parties wanted a judge or an arbitrator to decide whether
they agreed to arbitrate a matter. Rather the relevant question here is what
kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to."'30 By phrasing the issue
in this case as one of a type of arbitration proceeding, rather than a type of
dispute, the plurality easily distinguished this case from First Options.
The plurality summarily determined that "[a]rbitrators are well situated
to answer" the question of whether this contract would allow for a class
25 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
26 Id. Note that the plurality defines what types of questions are not for the arbitrator
and note that they are referred to as exceptions. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
defines what an arbitrator can decide, rather than what the arbitrator cannot decide. See
infra note 41 and accompanying text. One of the fundamental differences between the
plurality and the dissent may be whether there should be a presumption that either the
arbitrator or the court be the initial decisionmaker.27 id.
28 id.
29 514 U.S. 938 (1995). See supra note 2 for a description of the facts and holding of
First Options. As the Bazzle court noted, this issue is a "gateway" issue, Bazzle, 123
S. Ct. at 2407, that must be decided before the substance of the dispute can be uncovered.
Similarly, this issue of formation should be an issue for the courts because it would be
unfair to enforce a contract to arbitrate against a party that may or may not be bound by
that very contract.30 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407 (citations omitted). Presumably, the Court would find
that a party would not have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute in the following
example. Parties X and Y have a contract for X to roof Y's house. The contract includes a
broad arbitration clause. If X runs into Y's car and Y sues X to recover damages, X should
not be able to compel arbitration, no matter how broad the roofing arbitration clause is
written. The court should be able to hear the issue of whether the roofing contract
extended so far as to cover unrelated torts.
2004]
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action arbitration. 3 Thus, the plurality vacated the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the cases to arbitration. 32 The
judgments in the original arbitrations needed to be vacated because of the
court's involvement in these cases.33 If the arbitrators had originally decided
the arbitrability issue and the case were one merely challenging the award,
the plurality would have presumably upheld the judgments.
IV. JUSTICE STEVEN'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion focusing on the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).34 According to Stevens, the decision of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina that "class action arbitrations are permissible if not
prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement" is an outcome consistent
with the FAA.35 Justice Stevens conceded that the arbitrator probably should
have made the initial decision concerning the arbitrability of class action
disputes, but found that because the arbitrators heard the merits of the cases,
the outcomes were not tainted.36 Because the decision that class action
arbitration could be conducted was a legally correct conclusion, the issue of
who made this decision should not affect the outcome of the case. 37 However,
Justice Stevens stated that he will concur in this case in order to have a
"controlling judgment of the Court" and because the differences between his
and Justice Breyer's views are slight.38
V. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in this case, and his dissenting opinion
is joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. 39 The Chief Justice dissented
31 Id.
321 Id. at 2408.
33 Id.
34 9 U.S.C. §1-16 (2000).
3' Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2409. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part). This argument has a considerable flaw. The FAA was written nearly 100 years
ago in an effort to enforce arbitration agreements between merchants. The text of the
FAA is short, and there is nothing in the FAA that governs anything other than the
guarantee of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and a limited right to review.
Almost anything that a court could rule is consistent with the FAA because the FAA
contains so few provisions.36 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).37 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).3SBazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2408-09 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
39 Justice Thomas also dissented in this case, but he did not join the opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Thomas believes that the FAA does not apply to state
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on two grounds: (1) First Options should control this case rather than
Howsam, and (2) the wording of the contract language implicitly prohibited
class action arbitration. Because these cases went to arbitration, the South
Carolina Supreme Court effectively coerced the parties into class arbitration.
The plurality opinion responds to each of these arguments, which will be
addressed in turn.
The Chief Justice noted that courts generally give great deference to the
decisions on matters properly before the arbitrator.40 However, the presence
of an arbitration clause does not necessarily mean that the parties intended a
particular dispute to be arbitrated.41 Under First Options, the courts have the
ability to hear some questions of arbitrability, and these are questions that the
parties "reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator would
decide., 42 The First Options decision also stated that "one can understand
why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the 'who
",43
should decide arbitrability' point as giving the arbitrator that power....
The Chief Justice reasoned that questions of to whom a matter is submitted is
"[j]ust as fundamental" to the agreement as the question of what is submitted
to that decision-maker. 44 Because both of these questions are fundamental to
the agreement to arbitrate, the parties must have intended that the court,
rather than the arbitrator, would decide this issue.
45
The Chief Justice noted the difference between questions of procedural
and substantive arbitrability, acknowledging that the arbitrator, rather than
the courts, is presumptively permitted to answer so-called "procedural"
court proceedings and that it cannot preempt state law. As a result, the decision of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina should have been upheld. Id. at 2411 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Despite Justice Thomas's thoughts to the contrary, the FAA has been applied
to state court cases for decades. Despite Justice Thomas's thoughts to the contrary, the
FAA has been applied to state court cases for decades. See Jim Moore, Bad Facts, Good
Law-Thoughts on Engall v. Permanente Medical Group, 26 W. ST. U. L. REv. 135,
139-42 (1998-99). In fact, although the FAA is a federal statute, it does not
independently bestow federal jurisdiction on the parties, see 9 U.S.C. 1-16 (2003), so the
parties must have another reason to enter federal court. If the FAA could not apply to
state cases, then Congress would have passed a law with almost no effect if Justice
Thomas were correct on this point of law.40 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2409.
41 See id. ("But the decision of what to submit to the arbitrator is a matter of
contractual agreement by the parties, and the interpretation of that contract is for the
court, not for the arbitrator.").
421 Id. (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 945). Note, however, that the decision in
First Options was a much easier case to decide than Bazzle because the arbitration
agreement in First Options was never signed. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying
text.
43 id.
44 id.
45 Id.
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46questions. He characterized procedural questions as those primarily
involving "allegations of waiver, delay, or like defenses to arbitrability," as
was the case in Howsam.47 The issue of whether a class action arbitration is
prohibited is not an allegation of "waiver, delay, or [a] like defense[]," and,
as such, it is not a question of procedural arbitrability, but of substantive
arbitrability.4 s
The dissent and plurality views differ in the way they characterize what
dispute is to be arbitrated. The plurality opinion focuses on the fact that the
parties agreed to arbitrate issues relating to their loan contract.49 Because the
parties clearly agreed to arbitrate issues relating to the loan, and because the
issue of class action is an issue relating to the loan, it is appropriate for an
arbitrator to hear this claim. 50 The Chief Justice, however, views the dispute
quite differently. For the dissent, the question of what can be arbitrated is the
class action dispute.5 The dissenting opinion shifts the focus from whether
arbitration is appropriate for a loan dispute to whether arbitration is
46 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2410 ( '"Procedural" questions which grow out of the
dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively not for the judge, but for an
arbitrator, to decide.") (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557
(1964)).47 Id. Under this characterization of procedural versus substantive arbitrability, the
Howsam claim of a statute of limitations defense would clearly fall under procedural
arbitrability. See supra note 4 for more information on Howsam and its effect on this
case.
Note that the Chief Justice is attempting to define the scope of the arbitrator's
authority while the plurality is attempting to define the scope of the court's authority. It is
not explicitly stated in either opinion that one should be the rule while the other should be
the exception to the rule. However, each opinion limits the power of either the court or of
the arbitrator in order to arrive at their respective conclusions. See supra note 22 for a
discussion of the implication of the plurality's definition of the scope of permissible court
questions.
48 The Chief Justice does not expressly state that this dispute falls within the
category of substantive arbitrability. Instead, he states that the question of class action
arbitration is not a matter of procedural arbitrability because it does not fall within one of
the categories enumerated in Howsam. This might be a distinction without a difference,
especially as the plurality seems to be moving away from the distinctions between
procedural and substantive arbitrability. The plurality opinion does not make this
distinction, and this may be for a number of reasons. First, the plurality could wish to
eliminate the distinction, thereby eliminating the confusion that arises from making the
difficult procedural versus substantive determination. Or, the plurality could be
attempting to enlarge the scope of questions suitable for an arbitrator by creating a broad
presumption with a few, limited exceptions.491 Id. at 2406-08.
50 Id.
" Id. at 2409-10. The Chief Justice acknowledges that the parties had a valid
arbitration clause covering issues related to the loan.
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appropriate for a class action dispute. The Chief Justice can only classify this
question as one of substantive arbitrabiltiy after making this key distinction.
The dissenting opinion also makes an argument based solely on the
contract language. Under the terms of the contract, any disputes "shall be
resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent
of you. 52 Furthermore, the "us" is defined as the bank, and the "you" is
defined as the lender of the contract.53 The contract also states that disputes
resulting from "this" contract shall be subject to arbitration.5 4 The bank, then,
"must select, and each buyer must agree to, a particular arbitrator for disputes
between [the bank] and that specific buyer. 55 Thus, the contract, while
explicitly silent on the issue of class actions, may actually prohibit them
because the contract language uses singular nouns, and because unnamed
members of the class action would be unable to choose the arbitrator in a
class action arbitration. 56 The plurality quickly rejected this contract
interpretation because the unnamed members must have agreed to the
selection of the arbitrator by virtue of the fact that they consented to remain
part of the class.
57
In sum, the dissenting opinion presented two reasons why the plurality
incorrectly decided that an arbitrator should have decided whether or not a
class action arbitration is prohibited under the contract. The first of these
reasons, that the parties did not agree to arbitrate class action disputes, is
meritorious, but only if the dispute at issue can correctly be characterized as
a "class action" dispute rather than a "loan" dispute. The argument based on
the language of the contract agreement is shakier because it relies so heavily
on semantics and because parties in the future58 can so easily work around
this opinion by merely changing the definition of the word "you" from the
singular to the plural.
VI. THE IMPACT OF GREEN TREE
The decision of the Court in Green Tree will effect both class action
arbitrations and the issue of arbitrability as a whole. The decision will have
52Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2410.
53 Id.
54 id.5 1 Id. at 2411.
56 See id.57 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2406. The plurality opinion makes clear through both its
language and its tone that this argument is merely one of semantics. The tone of the
plurality suggests that the Chief Justice is grasping at straws in order to make an
argument to achieve what he believes is the right result in the case, despite law to the
contrary.
58 See infra notes 59-61 for a discussion on how parties may be able to avoid this
decision through more careful drafting.
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an immediate effect on how arbitration clauses are worded-especially in the
arena of consumer transactions. With respect to class action arbitrations, by
placing the initial decision in the hands of the arbitrators, the court system
will become completely removed from these cases until, perhaps, a final
decision has been made. Furthermore, the Court offers no guidance in how a
class action arbitration should be conducted or whether certain procedures
are necessary in order to preserve the constitutional rights of unnamed
parties.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Court's decision is that the
scope of arbitrability questions reserved from the arbitrator to hear on first
impression has grown tremendously. The Court not only abandons the
distinctions between substantive and procedural arbitrability but also gives
arbitrators the power to hear claims that previously could have been
considered court issues. Although this decision may be seen as the next
logical step in the Court's recent arbitration jurisprudence, the outcome may
have given arbitrators more power than any participant ever imagined that
they could have.
A. The Impact on Class Action Arbitrations
The Court's opinion in Green Tree will have a dramatic effect on the
enforceability of class action clauses-or lack thereof-in consumer and
other contracts. This effect will be seen in three ways. First, the decision will
probably be quickly extended to cases involving consolidation as well as
class action arbitration. 9 Second, lawyers and other contract writers will
probably become more conscious of the language they use when drafting
arbitration agreements to explicitly prohibit class action arbitrations. Finally,
the Green Tree opinion may result in more class action arbitrations, but it
offers no guidance on how the process should be governed and what-if
any-safeguards need to be in place to assure fairness to unnamed parties.
At least one court has already extended the holding in Green Tree to
cases involving the arbitration of consolidated cases, rather than class action
arbitration. 60 The purposes behind both of these processes are similar:
59 Both consolidations and class actions are ways in which one proceeding can
determine the outcome of a controversy for multiple parties. However, in a consolidation,
all of the parties are named parties who have the ability to be present at the arbitration
hearing. A class action, by contrast, contains a class of unnamed parties that are
represented by carefully chosen named parties. While consolidations can include as many
parties as want to participate, they are usually smaller than class actions because each
party must actively participate in the process. Note that arbitrators commonly hear
consolidated claims, especially under collective bargaining agreements.
" See, e.g., Pedcor Management Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of
Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) ("To the extent that the issue of
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resolving more than one dispute at the same time is more efficient and it can
provide an incentive for similarly situated plaintiffs to pool resources and
bring otherwise uneconomic lawsuits. 61 If the arbitrator is competent to
decide whether or not a class action is appropriate for a particular claim, then
he or she should be similarly competent to decide on the appropriateness of
consolidation because the processes are similar. By virtue of the fact that
each member in a consolidation is represented, either pro se or by counsel,
there may be less danger for an arbitrator to decide the appropriateness of the
procedure because all of the affected parties are at the bargaining table.62
If the holding of Green Tree is interpreted narrowly in the future,
individual contract writers may be able to work around the holding. If read
narrowly, the Green Tree decision merely holds that an arbitrator makes the
determination of the appropriateness of class action arbitration if the
arbitration clause is silent on the issue.63 Any lawyer who has read this case
will now include a provision that either prohibits class or consolidated
arbitration proceedings or expressly states that a court is to hear these claims
rather than an arbitrator. However, prohibiting class actions explicitly may
make arbitration contracts-especially consumer contracts of adhesion-
consolidation in arbitration is analogous to class arbitration, Green Tree's holding that
arbitrators, not courts, decide whether an agreement provides for class arbitration would
appear to overrule [5th Circuit precedent] holding to the contrary.").
61 Certainly, there are other reasons why a group of people would want to proceed as
a group rather than as a whole. For instance, the presence of more plaintiffs could be used
as an intimidation factor or as a way to increase the amount of settlement. See, e.g., In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (Judge Posner
decertified the class action at issue in order to prevent the possible bankruptcy of a
company subject to an especially weak class action claim); see generally Charles Silver,
"We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357
(2003) (explaining how plaintiffs in a class action can have the potential to blackmail
defendants into either settling or for settling for more than a claim is worth).
The differences between consolidation and class action claims may create different
incentives for instituting a group claim. If all of the consolidated claims involve plaintiffs
who have their own counsel, then there may be little cost-savings advantage to the
arrangement. But, there might still be an intimidation factor or a bargaining chip. See,
e.g., Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising,
and Clarfing Arbitration Law, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 13-16 (explaining how the right
to a consolidation in arbitration can have the benefits of class-action litigation and how
such a process would work under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act).
62 There is a potential for constitutional violations if class action and consolidation
arbitration proceedings do not provide participants protections either identical to or
similar to the protections guaranteed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The danger, however, of violating the due process rights of a party in consolidation is
lessened because each party is represented at the arbitration.
63 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407.
2004]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
unconscionable.64 Thus, Green Tree might not have a substantial effect on
the issue of class action arbitrations if the decision can be avoided by careful
drafting without being unconscionable.
Finally, the Green Tree decision mandates that arbitrators should decide
whether class action arbitration is appropriate under a contract that is silent
on the issue, but the Court does not offer any guidance on how to make that
decision. The Court merely states that the arbitrator should be capable, but
the Court does not delve any deeper into this discussion.65 Class action
lawsuits are governed by a series of complicated rules and case law.66
Lawyers who attempt to represent class action parties must be capable,
experienced attorneys.67 These rules are necessary in order to preserve the
due process rights of unnamed class members who will later be bound by a
decision in a procedure in which they did not participate.68 It is unclear
whether an arbitrator must abide by these rules and whether an arbitrator is
even capable of protecting unnamed members of a class action.
For these three reasons, the Court's decision in Green Tree may lead to
more questions than it answers. Because there have been relatively few class
action arbitrations to date, there is no traditional way to conduct such a
procedure. If parties cannot contract around the holding in this decision, it is
64 There are mixed opinions concerning the conscionability of prohibitions on class
actions. Compare Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an arbitration agreement prohibiting class action arbitration substantively
unconscionable), with Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
that a prohibition on class action arbitration does not make a contract unconscionable).
The question of conscionability at some point must be addressed; however, it is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
However, these courts did not state whether a court could initially entertain a motion
for class action certification if the contract clearly stated that a court, rather than an
arbitrator, would certify the class. Indeed, a few courts in California have certified classes
before an arbitrator made a determination on the merits. See Blue Cross of California v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (court certification of a class
action arbitration). It is unclear how the Green Tree decision will affect these types of
cases.
65 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2408.
66 Class action lawsuits in federal court are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIv. P. 23. This particular rule contains numerous
requirements intended to protect unnamed members of the class. There is also a
considerable amount of case law on the issue that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
67 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ("[T]he representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."). This requirement has been read to include
the experience and resources of the parties representing the named parties. A recent
amendment to Rule 23 specifically pertains to appointing class counsel. The Rule notes
that the court must look at specific factors in determining appropriate counsel including
"counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of
the type asserted in the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (g)(1)(c)(i).
6F See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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unclear how an arbitrator will conduct a class action proceeding and what
that arbitrator will do to protect the rights of both the represented and
unnamed parties.
B. The Impact on Arbitrability in General
The Court's decision in Green Tree not only affects the future of class
action arbitrations but also affects the treatment of questions of arbitrability.
Over the past two decades, the Court has increased the scope of appropriate
questions for an arbitrator to decide, and this case follows in that tradition.
The result of these cases is to dangerously tread on the power of courts to
determine some contractual gateway issues.
Prior to Green Tree, the Court relied on the distinction between a
question of "substantive" and "procedural" arbitrability to determine whether
the court or an arbitrator should decide the question. The Court reserved for
itself questions of substantive arbitrability, but it allowed arbitrators to
entertain questions of procedural arbitrability. 69 Generally speaking,
questions of substantive arbitrability relate to the existence of the arbitration
agreement and whether the arbitration agreement should cover a typical type
of dispute. The reason that courts should hear these questions is because it is
unclear whether or not the parties even agreed to arbitrate or whether they
agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.7° The Supreme Court reasons that
these are the types of disputes that the parties generally expect the courts to
hear, so the courts should hear them.7' Conversely, questions of procedural
arbitrability include defenses to claims that are properly before an
arbitrator.72 Examples of questions of procedural arbitrability include
statutes of limitations defenses, issues of waiver, and most other defenses.
73
The Green Tree plurality, however, appears to have abandoned this
dichotomy. The plurality recognizes that courts should hear cases involving
formation and that arbitrators should hear issues involving defenses and
waivers, but the Court abandons the terms "procedural" and "substantive"
69 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. It would be fundamentally unfair to
allow the arbitrator to determine whether or not the parties even agreed to arbitration. In
the United States, litigation is the typical method whereby legal disputes are decided. The
alternatives to litigation are generally voluntary. If an arbitrator is to decide whether or
not the parties have a valid claim to arbitrate or whether they have agreed to arbitrate a
particular claim, the process is no longer voluntary for the person who is challenging the
formation of the agreement or the applicability of the agreement to a particular dispute.
"1 See Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407.72 See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
" See supra note 4.
2004]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
arbitrability.74 The plurality decision, however, does not appear to merely
drop the labels but maintain the distinction.75 Instead, the plurality opinion
appears to have broadened the scope of the questions suitable for the
arbitrator and limited the questions suitable for the courts to merely two
types of questions: contract formation and applicability of arbitration to a
particular dispute.76 The plurality opinion could have maintained the
previously enumerated distinction by stating that questions of permissibility
of class actions are merely procedural arbitrability questions. But it did not.
Instead, the tenor of the opinion reads as though all questions with the
admittedly narrow exceptions are questions for the arbitrator rather than the
courts.7 7 If this is the case-and nothing in the opinion suggests otherwise-
then the arbitrators have just been handed considerable power to decide
intricate legal issues with which they may not be familiar.78 The plurality
opinion also acknowledges legal precedent stating that the courts should
determine issues that the parties would expect the courts to handle.79
Although the Court cites this familiar principle, the plurality does not explain
why the parties supposedly intended the arbitrator to hear this case and not
the courts. Indeed, in the Bazzles' case, the parties approached the courts in
the first instance to determine the question of class action arbitration. So, it is
hard to argue that the parties intended the arbitrator to hear the claim if they
initially asked the courts to resolve it. Although the Court states that the
74 The plurality opinion does not refer to questions for either the courts or the
arbitrator as either "substantive" or "procedural."
7' As noted supra in note 2, the First Options court also did not use the "substantive"
and "procedural" terminology; however, the Court's opinion fell squarely in line with
these commonly held notions. As the Court has answered more difficult questions, as in
Howsam and in Bazzle, the Court begins to blur the distinction between the two.
76123 S. Ct. at 2407.
7 The exception for formation is important, and it is, arguably, something more than
a "narrow" exception. However, the plurality opinion refers to the exceptions as "limited
circumstances." Id.
78 One of the greatest benefits of alternative dispute resolution is the ability for the
parties to determine who they want to act as the decision-maker of the dispute. The
arbitrator may be chosen on the basis of expertise in the substantive area of the dispute;
for example, an engineer may act as an arbitrator in a dispute concerning the collapse of a
building. Arbitrators do not have to be lawyers or judges. They do not have to have any
certain educational background or any specific type of training. Under Green Tree v.
Bazzle, arbitrators that are not legally trained may find themselves in a position in which
they have to make legal findings. In the Bazzle case, if the arbitrators are unfamiliar with
the law, they should have a difficult time determining if certification is appropriate in a
given case because of the magnitude of the claim and the intricacies of the law. As noted
above, an unqualified arbitrator may not be able to sufficiently protect the constitutional
rights of the participants, see supra notes 60-62, but this issue has never been addressed
by the Court.79 Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407.
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parties' intent will, or should, control, the plurality obviously did not enforce
the intent of the Bazzles to take their claim to court. Because of this disregard
for the parties' intent, it is doubtful that intent-unless that intent is clearly
stated in the contractual language-would control a term that is absent from
a contract. Unless the defense is one of those stated above, no amount of
unwritten intent is likely to create an issue for the courts, rather than for the
arbitrator.
VII. CONCLUSION
The plurality opinion is clearly the next logical step in the line of
opinions giving increasing power to arbitrators and removing cases from the
court dockets. Although the Court is acting in a consistent manner, it may be
overlooking some serious policy considerations to the contrary. This opinion
is the next in a line of cases removing the distinction between "procedural"
and "substantive" arbitrability, and replacing it with a presumption that the
arbitrator will decide most of these questions.
In making this decision, the plurality ignores the issue of how to run a
class action arbitration, especially in light of the fact that many arbitrators are
not experts on the law and not experts on the intricacies of the law governing
class actions. Furthermore, the plurality glossed over the issue of the parties'
intent to submit the issue of class action arbitration despite the fact that one
of the consolidated cases actually did go to court to determine the
appropriateness of class action arbitration.
Although this decision may be consistent with the policy of stare decisis,
it ignores any potential downfalls. While it is possible that those writing
contracts may simply become more careful with their language, this opinion
leaves open the possibility that any question short of contract formation or
applicability of an arbitration clause to a particular claim will become a
question for an arbitrator, despite the parties' intent and the history of the
courts in solving those particular problems.
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